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SecurityThis paper introduces keytagging, a novel technique to protect medical image-based tests by implement-
ing image authentication, integrity control and location of tampered areas, private captioning with
role-based access control, traceability and copyright protection. It relies on the association of tags (binary
data strings) to stable, semistable or volatile features of the image, whose access keys (called keytags)
depend on both the image and the tag content. Unlike watermarking, this technique can associate infor-
mation to the most stable features of the image without distortion. Thus, this method preserves the clin-
ical content of the image without the need for assessment, prevents eavesdropping and collusion attacks,
and obtains a substantial capacity-robustness tradeoff with simple operations. The evaluation of this
technique, involving images of different sizes from various acquisition modalities and image modiﬁca-
tions that are typical in the medical context, demonstrates that all the aforementioned security measures
can be implemented simultaneously and that the algorithm presents good scalability. In addition to this,
keytags can be protected with standard Cryptographic Message Syntax and the keytagging process can be
easily combined with JPEG2000 compression since both share the same wavelet transform. This reduces
the delays for associating keytags and retrieving the corresponding tags to implement the aforemen-
tioned measures to only ’ 30 and ’ 90 ms respectively. As a result, keytags can be seamlessly integrated
within DICOM, reducing delays and bandwidth when the image test is updated and shared in secure
architectures where different users cooperate, e.g. physicians who interpret the test, clinicians caring
for the patient and researchers.
 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
The landscape of healthcare has evolved dramatically in the last
few years with the digitization of medical image-based tests and
the deployment of standard protocols for their storage and trans-
mission, such as the Digital Imaging and COmmunication in
Medicine (DICOM [1]) standard. The new e-health model [2] fos-
ters ubiquitous and pervasive access to users of medical informa-
tion: physicians who interpret the tests, clinicians caring for the
patient, patients, researchers, medical teachers and students, etc.
Furthermore, it enables the establishment of cooperative architec-
tures where different authorized users may perform some editing
of the image (e.g. adding annotations), update its attached infor-
mation (e.g. examination-related data, patient demographics,
health records) and share with others. On the one hand, thisreduces the time for diagnosis and enables more accurate treat-
ments, more thorough researches, and the provision of e-learning
or commercial uses, depending on patient consent. On the other
hand, the e-health model requires a high level of accessibility to
medical information, which increases its potential risks. Since
image-based tests include sensitive information, they are a target
for eavesdropping, which may result in social and professional
damage for the victim; and also for tampering and forgery, which
may lead to misdiagnosis, mistreatments and wrong research out-
comes. Current legal regulations such as the HIPAA [3] in the USA,
the PIPEDA [4] in Canada and the LOPD [5] in Spain require the
implementation of robust security policies to protect medical
image-based tests. For this purpose, different security measures
may be combined [6,7]:
 Role-based access control (RBAC), so that each authorized user
can read and/or edit certain contents of the image-based test
according to his/her professional role, e.g. physician, researcher,
teacher, etc.
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which would endanger its clinical value.
 Tamper location, pinpointing the areas where the image has
been manipulated, which may be helpful to validate images
that are modiﬁed in permissible areas.
 Authentication, assessing if the image received corresponds to
the image originally acquired, to an image derived from the
original or to an unrelated image.
 Private captioning, associating private information with the
image, only retrievable by authorized users of the authenticated
image.
 Traceability control for user accountability, by associating
marks from each entity that processes the image.
 Copyright protection, to pursue illegal copies if the image has a
commercial use.
Hitherto, these security measures have traditionally been
implemented in the medical context by means of cryptography,
mainly in medical standards such as DICOM; or watermarking,
mainly in research works. Nonetheless, these techniques present
several disadvantages that limit their applicability for the protec-
tion of cooperative medical architectures (see Section 2). This
paper proposes a new research direction, based on the goal of per-
forming a secure and fast association of different types of data,
called tags, to certain image features. These features and their asso-
ciated tags may be categorized as stable, semistable or volatile,
according to their robustness, i.e. their resistance to changing their
values when the image undergoes some processing, such as com-
pression or ﬁltering. Stable tags would be suitable for authentica-
tion, traceability and copyright protection; semistable tags would
be appropriate for private captioning with RBAC, and volatile tags
would be ideal for integrity control and location of tampered areas.
The association of tags to suitable features would be performed by
means of a novel technique, called keytagging, whose main chal-
lenges are the extraction of image features with adequate robust-
ness and the efﬁcient encoding of the tags as a subset of the
extracted features, by means of a map. This map will be com-
pressed and protected to produce a stable, semistable or volatile
keytag, which is an access key to retrieve the content of the tag
from the image.
Compared to other alternatives, keytagging presents ﬁve rele-
vant features, derived from the fact that this technique does not
modify the medical image to associate information. First and most
obvious, the image always preserves its clinical quality, without
the need for assessment. Second, even very stable features can be
used to encode keytags, which ensures high robustness and capac-
ity. Third, no complex rules are necessary for the selection of the
image features, since there is no risk of destroying its clinical value.
Fourth, collusion and forgery attacks have no effect on keytagged
image-based tests. Fifth, keytagging enables the deployment of
secure and efﬁcient cooperative architectures, since each user
can add information related with the test by associating new key-
tags, with no risk of distorting or removing the previous ones. To
share this update of the test, it is enough to send the new keytags
to the rest of the users.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 analyzes
related works and sets the background of this research. Section 3
depicts in detail the keytagging algorithms. Section 4 evaluates
the performance of this approach by using different-size images
from various medical acquisition modalities (CT, MRI, US,
PET-CT), and image processing techniques that are common in
the medical context. Based on the results retrieved, Section 5 pro-
poses appropriate keytagging parameters for implementing the
aforementioned security measures and depicts a risk assessment
of the keytagging method. Next, Section 6 approaches the integra-
tion of keytags within the DICOM protocol, to enable thedevelopment of efﬁcient architectures in which different users
can update the DICOM ﬁle maintaining its security level. Finally,
Section 7 outlines the main conclusions from this research and
proposes future lines of work.2. Related work
Keytagging has relevant inﬂuences from both cryptography and
watermarking. The keytagging algorithm uses cryptographic tools
to protect the keytags while the idea of associating data to different
features of the image was motivated by watermarking techniques,
which embed data into certain parts of the image. The advance
introduced by keytagging is the ability to perform this association
without embedding the data into the image, which permits avoid-
ing any image distortion. Both keytagging and watermarking face a
tradeoff between the robustness of keytags/watermarks and their
capacity to host large contents, and both techniques require the
protection of keytags/watermarks to prevent or hinder eavesdrop-
ping and forgery.
2.1. Cryptography
Cryptography provides two efﬁcient and reliable tools to pro-
tect image-based tests, which may also be applied to watermarks
and/or keytags. These are encryption, which may be symmetric
or asymmetric; and hashing, which is found in digital signatures
(DS) and hash message authentication codes (HMAC). The former
can be used to implement RBAC by means of Cryptographic
Message Syntax (CMS [8]), while the latter enables binary integrity
control (tampered/non-tampered), authentication and traceability.
Furthermore, private captioning can also be implemented by
encrypting some content based on the hash of the image [9].
However, the location of tampered areas in an image would be bur-
densome since it would require multiple hashing of different parts
of that image. The typical policy to protect an image-based test, e.g.
a DICOM ﬁle, is to de-identify the private data of the image, include
it with the information associated to the image, and use CMS to
implement RBAC on this data, leaving the de-authenticated image
unencrypted and adding a DS to the ﬁle to guarantee integrity and
authentication. In addition, each entity that processes the ﬁle shall
add its own DS for traceability.
The main issue in cryptography-based policies like this is the
difﬁculty of developing cooperative architectures while maintain-
ing the security measures. Any change in the test will invalidate
all the previous signatures, and even though a new DS can be cal-
culated, the traceability from the origin will be lost. An alternative
is that each user adds his/her changes to the original test, digitally
signs it and delivers the signed updated test to the rest of the users.
In this way, the rest of the users can store the updated test with
security, and add new updates from the last test version by follow-
ing the same procedure. Nonetheless, as the number of users and
updates of the medical image-based test grow, this approach
becomes quite impractical in terms of delays, bandwidth and
storage.
2.2. Watermarking
Medical ImageWatermarking [10,6,7] (MIW) techniques embed
limited amounts of hidden data (e.g. medical information), with
one or several watermarks, within a medical image by means of
image modiﬁcations and keys. The main feature of MIW is that
the image can be manipulated (e.g. annotated, compressed with
JPEG2000 [11], adjusted with different contrast and brightness)
by the users without interference to its security regardless of
whether they know about the existence of the watermarks. The
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required to retrieve the embedded data and neither depend on the
data nor on the image. There are different types of watermarks, and
they may be combined to implement a security policy. Robust
watermarks [12,13], whose content is retrievable even if the image
has undergone heavy modiﬁcations, may be used for authentica-
tion, traceability and copyright protection. Semifragile watermarks
[14], whose content is retrievable only if those modiﬁcations are
mild (e.g. if the image preserves its clinical value), may be used
for private captioning. Finally, fragile watermarks [15,16], whose
content is retrievable only if the image is intact, may be used to
implement integrity control and location of tampered areas in
the image. Role-based control is also guaranteed since different
watermarks, intended for different users, may be embedded in
the same image. It is worth pointing out that MIW techniques
require to produce a minimum distortion of the image to preserve
its clinical value. In fact these techniques are often grouped in
three categories depending on the manner how they cope with this
requirement of high transparency.
The ﬁrst group are the non-reversible techniques, which pro-
duce a permanent distortion on the image because they perform
non-invertible operations, typically bit quantization, replacement
or truncation. As a consequence, a thorough clinical assessment
is necessary to guarantee that the clinical value of the water-
marked images is preserved. Regarding watermarking domains,
while the ﬁrst approaches [17,18] used the replacement of least
signiﬁcant bits (LSB) of pixels, which can only host fragile water-
marks; the subsequent use of regions of different amounts of
energy in transform domains allowed the embedding of multiple
(robust, semifragile and fragile) watermarks in the same image
[19–21]. Furthermore, medical data could be embedded in a com-
pressed domain to combine the watermarking with lossy compres-
sion [22,23].
The second group of MIW techniques corresponds to those that
embed mainly in regions of non-interest (RONI) of the image. This
minimizes the interference of the watermarks with the clinical
content and avoids the need for clinical assessment. Robust water-
marks are embedded in the RONI, surrounding the ROI [24–26] to
try to avoid its deletion if the image is clipped, or in random loca-
tions [27–29] to increase the capacity. Only fragile watermarks for
integrity control need to be embedded, at least partially, in the ROI.
The security of these techniques against eavesdropping and forgery
is low, since the modiﬁed pixels/coefﬁcients where the water-
marks were embedded are easy to identify in the RONI, which is
usually black. Moreover, the RONI may be used to insert visible
watermarks or removed if medical image compression [30] is
applied. In both cases the watermark/s would be partially or totally
removed.
The third group are the reversible/lossless/invertible/erasable
techniques, which distort the image but can recover its original
quality by completely removing the watermarks after they have
been detected and validated. This new concept of watermarking
was ﬁrst introduced in [31], and since then a variety of methods
have been developed. Difference expansion, a kind of integer wave-
let transform with high redundancy, was proposed early on in [32],
obtaining low-distortion and high-capacity. Histogram operations,
such as circular interpretation of bijective transformations [33], are
also an effective manner to implement reversible watermarking
with notable endurance to lossy compression. The addition of a vir-
tual border where patient data is inserted in the LSB, at the cost of
increasing the image size, has also been proposed [34]. The use of
an estimator signal to determine which pixel blocks can embed
information was proposed in [35], further used to embed a digest
of the knowledge associated to the image [36], and reﬁned in
[37] by introducing a secure random location signal for security
and implementing tamper detection and location. Similarly, aneffective tamper location watermarking based on partitioning an
authentication area into small regions in a multilevel hierarchical
manner is depicted in [38]. Nevertheless, any reversible technique
has two important drawbacks. First, it requires a secure environ-
ment since the image is unprotected once the watermarks are
removed. Second, a user not allowed to access certain watermarks
will not be able to remove them either, so he/she will work with a
lower-quality version of the image.
It can be concluded that various disadvantages hinder the inte-
gration of watermark-based policies in standards such as DICOM
and in cooperative architectures. First and most important, there
is a tradeoff between capacity, robustness and image distortion.
Thus, as new watermarks are added, especially if they are robust,
the quality of the image decreases and the image may lose its clin-
ical value, rendering it useless. Second, watermarks embedded by
different users may interfere with each other since each new
watermark may destroy part of the content of the others. Third,
there is a tradeoff between robustness and capacity, so robust
watermarks cannot be long. In addition to this, the use of water-
marking in cooperative architectures would imply an important
cost in bandwidth and delays, since every time that a user embeds
a watermark in an image, he/she has to send the watermarked
image together with the watermark keys to the rest of the users.
If an image is watermarked several times by different users, it
needs to be transmitted every time to the other users. In contrast,
keytagging requires that each user has a copy of the images to be
used for the keytagging. Once this requirement is met, different
users can associate tags with the only further requirement that
they transmit the corresponding keytags to the rest of the users.
3. Materials and methods
The procedure proposed for associating keytags fKTg, to bind
the content of some tags fTg to an image Ior , is formally described
in Algorithm 1 and illustrated by means of an example in Fig. 1;
while the procedure for retrieving fTg from Ior , or from some mod-
iﬁed version fIor , is deﬁned in Algorithm 2. fKeytagTypeg is an
important input parameter of these algorithms, which establishes
the expected robustness of the tags when Ior undergoes common
image modiﬁcations in the medical context and, according to it,
their security applications (analyzed in Section 5). Stable tags are
expected to be retrieved with low distortion even when eIor has
undergone aggressive image modiﬁcations which may have caused
the loss of its clinical value, semistable tags are intended to remain
undistorted only if eIor has undergone mild modiﬁcations and pre-
serves the clinical value of Ior , and volatile tags are intended to
be retrieved highly distorted even if the modiﬁcations of eIor are
minor. Both Algorithms 1 and 2 rely on a preprocessing of the
image, a selection of appropriate image features, a compact cod-
ing/decoding of the keytags and cryptographic protection of/access
to the keytags. These processes are depicted in detail throughout
Sections 3.1–3.4, which follow the notation described in Table 1.
Finally, Section 3.5 describes how keytagging can be integrated
within the JPEG2000 compressor.
3.1. Preprocessing
The ﬁrst step of Algorithms 1 and 2 (line 2) is the segmentation
of the region of interest (ROI) of the image, so that the tags can be
associated to the most important parts of the image. The intention
is to prevent the tags from being distorted or removed due to mod-
iﬁcations affecting the RONI, such as medical image compression
by areas [30], blackening private data for anonymization or the
insertion of visible watermarks. If all the tag are associated outside
the RONI, these modiﬁcations would be incapable of distorting or
Fig. 1. Main steps for the association of a stable keytag according to Algorithm 1.
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has been designed to obtain the ROI automatically, as is the case
in [39] with the atherosclerotic plaque ultrasound. In addition to
this, several medical image acquisition devices currently deliver
the image ROI separated from the blocks of associated data that
compose the RONI. For example, in the DICOM standard [1] a cali-
bration conﬁguration was introduced for ultrasound images in
which regions are deﬁned with the same calibration. But since
not all acquisition devices have this built-in capability, the ROI
may be roughly segmented by means of some simple method, with
the only conditions that the same method shall be used in both
Algorithms 1 and 2 and that it shall leave out at least part of the
black background and peripheral text of the image (if any). Werecommend the automatic delineation of the minimum bounding
rectangle (MBR) that encloses the medical image content (ROI).
As a ﬁnal step for the preprocessing, color ROIs are transformed
into grayscale by calculation of their luma components according
to the standard ITU-R Recommendation BT.601-7 [40]
(Algorithms 1 and 2: line 3). This ensures compliance with both
color and grayscale ROIs, and that further modiﬁcations of the color
map does not affect the tag/s.
3.2. Selection of suitable image features
The 2-D Discrete Wavelet Transform [41] (Algorithms 1 and 2:
line 5) decomposes the image into several scales, located in
Table 1
Operators and Notation.
Notation Meaning
output=s f ðinput=sÞ Assignment of value to one or several outputs from a function or operator f ðÞ with one or several inputs
½  Concatenation operator
d e Operator of rounding to the nearest greater integer
 Binary XOR operator
fXg Set of elements of type X, each element i represented as Xfig
#X Number of elements that compose the set X
Vði : j : kÞ Vector derived from a vector V, corresponding to a subset of its elements, ½VðiÞ;Vðiþ jÞ;Vðiþ 2  jÞ; . . . ;VðkÞ
Mð:Þ Vector derived from a matrix M, corresponding to the concatenation of its rows, ½Mð1; :Þ;Mð2; :Þ; . . . ;Mðend; :Þ
Ior Original image to be used for keytaggingfIor Modiﬁed version of Ior (e.g. compressed, ﬁltered, clipped, rotated)
ROIðIÞ Region of interest of an image I
RONIðIÞ Regions of non-interest of an image I
MBR Minimum bounding rectangle
RðIÞ;GðIÞ;BðIÞ Levels of R;G and B colors in RGB format of an image I
Ig Grayscale image derived from an image I.
CDF 9/7 or 5/3 Cohen–Daubechies–Feauveau 9/7-tap or 5/3 (also known as LeGall) ﬁlters
Coef ; h;w WTðI; f ; jÞ Function that returns Coef, the j-th wavelet decomposition calculated with ﬁlters f of an image I; h and w, the height and width of the
wavelet decomposition levels from 1 to j
MWLðIÞ Maximum wavelet decomposition level of an image I
LL Coefﬁcients of a wavelet subband obtained with horizontal and vertical low-pass ﬁltering
HL Coefﬁcients of a wavelet subband obtained with horizontal high-pass ﬁltering and vertical low-pass ﬁltering
LH Coefﬁcients of a wavelet subband obtained with horizontal low-pass and vertical high-pass ﬁltering
HL Coefﬁcients of a wavelet subband obtained with horizontal and vertical high-pass ﬁltering
aWLðIÞ Wavelet level allowed for an image I to associate certain tag/s
C Subset of coefﬁcients from aWL
F Features from C used for the coding of one or several T
absðXÞ Absolute value/s of X
LSBðXÞ Least signiﬁcant bit/s of X
T Tag, binary data string to be associated to an Ior by means of a KTeT Tag retrieved from a modiﬁed image, fIor
s out  LFSRðs; tÞ Linear feedback shift register with initial state s and taps t
GolombSeq A binary sequence that meets Golomb’s randomness postulates
ðXÞ A scrambled binary sequence derived from X by means of a reversible transformation
BM Bi-level map that encodes a tag as positions of certain coefﬁcients of aWL
KT Keytag, which permits the retrieval of a T from an image
Sk Secret key used for symmetric encryption–decryption
PrU Private key to be used by user U for asymmetric decryption of data or for its signature
PbU Public key of user U, used by any user for asymmetric encryption of data intended for U, or to verify any signature issued by U
DSðD;Alg; PrUÞ Digital signature of D using the algorithm Alg and the private key of the signatory U
checkDSðD;Alg; PbUÞ Veriﬁcation of the DS of D by using the algorithm Alg public key of the signatory U
encryptðPlaintext;Alg;KÞ Encryption of Plaintext using the algorithm Alg and the key K
decryptðCiphertext;Alg;KÞ Decryption of Ciphertext using the algorithm Alg and the key K
12 Ó.J. Rubio et al. / Journal of Biomedical Informatics 56 (2015) 8–29ordered regions of the transformed image, which host coefﬁcients
concentrating certain frequencies. This enables efﬁcient compres-
sion (e.g. by means of SPIHT [42] or JPEG2000 [11]), since any
entropy and/or run-length coding that exploits adequately the
self-similarities of the quantized coefﬁcients across different scales
achieves high compression ratios; and also facilitates keytag asso-
ciation because the transform separates stable, semistable and
volatile parts of the image. The main advantage of using wavelets
over other transforms is its variable resolution: the higher frequen-
cies, which correspond to details (volatile features of the image),
are represented with higher spatial resolution than the lower fre-
quencies. To obtain WTðROIg ; f ; jÞ;ROIg is initially ﬁltered by rows
and columns with two ﬁlters, decimated by two and arranged in
four subimages: LL; LH;HL;HH. The process is iteratively repeated,
taking the last LL as input, until reaching the desired j-th decompo-
sition level. As a result, the lowest frequencies (most important
parts, stable features) of the image are represented with only a
few high-magnitude coefﬁcients, located in the upper-left corner
of WTðROIg ; f ; jÞ—note this in the 5th-level decomposition in
Fig. 1: upper right corner. The choice of the wavelet family, which
sets the ﬁlters f, is relevant for compression but it was empirically
found that it does not have a big impact on the robustness-capacity
tradeoff. The only exception to the latter rule was observed when f
are set to those used by a compressor, which improves the robust-
ness to this compressor for a given capacity. Thus, our choice isusing the ﬁlters implemented by the widespread JPEG2000 com-
pressor [43] (see Section 3.5), CDF 9/7 for lossy compression and
CDF 5/3 for lossless compression, which also saves a number of
operations when keytagging is combined with compression (see
Section 4.5). If the information about the compressor is not avail-
able, f is set to CDF 9/7 since further compression would be more
likely performed with lossy JPEG2000.
In keytagging, the choice of wavelet level, j, is very relevant.
High j values permit obtaining very stable image features from
the lowest frequencies. Tags retrieved from keytags associated to
these features endure with little or no distortion high image com-
pression rates and aggressive low-pass image ﬁltering, e.g. averag-
ing masks, Gaussian and median ﬁlters. Therefore, our choice is
setting the highest possible value (Algorithms 1 and 2: line 4),
MWL, given by the maximum number of recursive steps of decima-
tion by 2. Furthermore, it has been observed that each time a new
decomposition level is calculated, the sum of the energy of the
coefﬁcients in the four resulting subbands exceeds the energy of
the coefﬁcients in the mother subband. Thus, calculating the max-
imum decomposition level maximizes the number of high magni-
tude coefﬁcients available for keytagging. As is shown in Table 2,
the highest decomposition levels concentrate more energy,P
i;j2subbandCði;jÞ
2
#Cði;jÞ2subband , from the lowest frequencies. Nonetheless, they have
fewer coefﬁcients, which results in less capacity.
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ical image modiﬁcations in the medical context (see Section 4.1), it
was determined through exhaustive testing that the optimal sub-
set of wavelet coefﬁcients C for the association of keytags comes
from allowed wavelet levels, aWLP MWL 6 for stable keytags
(Algorithm 3: lines 17, 20), aWL 6 MWL 7for semistable
(Algorithm 3: lines 23–24), and the HH subband ofWL ¼ 1 for vola-
tile keytags (Algorithm 3: lines 27–28). This multiplexing of key-
tags in the wavelet domain is represented in Fig. 1: center. In
addition to this, the ﬁnal aWL for stable keytags is adjusted to
the length of the tag. It was empirically found that setting aWL
to the maximum wavelet level that contains a number of coefﬁ-
cients P 10  lengthðTÞ (Algorithm 3: lines 18–19) improves the
endurance of tags to local operations such as median ﬁltering,
while maintaining the endurance to compression and common
image processing. This occurs thanks to the restriction of preserv-
ing only those features coming from the lowest frequencies of the
image, the most robust to low-pass ﬁltering. Finally, the features F
that will be used for keytag coding are extracted. These are the sign
bit of the coefﬁcients in C (the most robust to image changes,
Algorithm 3: lines 21, 25) if the tag is stable/semistable and the
LSB if the tag is volatile (Algorithm 3: line 29).3.3. Coding and decoding of keytags
A keytag basically encodes an input tag T, a binary string, as the
positions of selected binary features F from the subset C. The
extraction of C from ROIg depends on the intended tag type (stable,
semistable or volatile), as explained in Section 3.2. The coding pro-
posed below is intended to bound the keytag with the image in a
compact and fast manner. To ensure this bounding, each feature
F can encode only one T bit. Otherwise, it would be known that
each time that a certain feature is repeated, it encodes the same
bit value, so a percentage of T bits could be derived from the keytag
without the image. In addition to this, the algorithm encodes uni-
directionally since changes of direction would indicate that two
consecutive T bits have opposite values.
To minimize the size of the keytags, T and F are transformed
into ðTÞ and ðFÞ by means of a scrambling process (Algorithm 1:
lines 9–10). The intention of this scrambling is that the mean bit
value of ðTÞ and ðFÞ is approximately 0.5, and that any long series
of 0s or 1s is broken. To scramble the bits of T and F in a reversible
manner (see Algorithm 3: line 42), they are XOR-ed with a
sequence meeting Golomb’s randomness postulates [44], so that
the operation can be reversed by a second XOR with the same
sequence. Golomb’s postulates establish that in this type of ran-
dom sequences (1) the number of 1s and 0s is approximately the
same; (2) half of the bits in the sequence belong to a series of
length 1 (e.g. . . .010. . ., . . .101. . .), a quarter of the bits in the
sequence belong to a series of length 2 (e.g. . . .0110. . .,
. . .1001. . .), an eight of the bits in the sequence belong to a series
of length 3 (e.g. . . .01110. . ., . . .10001. . .) and so on; and (3) that
the out-of-phase correlation ACðkÞ has the same value with differ-
ent values of k. The procedure to obtain a Golomb sequence con-
sists of running a non-zero input in a linear feedback shift
register [45] (see Algorithm 3: lines 42–46) with taps described
by an irreducible polynomial of the ﬁnite ﬁeld F2 [46]. We chose
the polynomial x17 þ x3 þ 1 (see Algorithm 1: line 6) to obtain a
high periodicity of 217  1, much larger than the size of any T to
be used in the evaluation (see Section 4), and truncate the resulting
Golomb sequence to the length of T/F.
As a result of scrambling, there is a probability of 0.5 of encod-
ing a ðTiÞ bit with the ﬁrst available feature in ðFÞ (when
ðTiÞ ¼ ðFjÞ), a probability of ð1 0:5Þ  0:5 ¼ 0:52 of encoding it
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probability of ð1 0:5Þ2  0:5 ¼ 0:53 of encoding it with the third
available feature (if ðTiÞ – ðFjÞ; ðTiÞ – ðFjþ1Þ; ðTiÞ ¼ ðFjþ2Þ) and
so on. According to this, the sum of the series
P1
k¼1ð0:5Þk  k gives
the average number of features from ðFÞ required to encode a
ðTÞ bit, 2. To guarantee high robustness, the function
buildBinaryMap (Algorithm 1: line 11) keeps only those features
of F coming from the N highest-magnitude coefﬁcients in absðCÞ
for the coding (see Algorithm 3: lines 31–40). N is the minimum
number of features from ðFÞ required for the coding of any ðTÞ
of a certain length. It has already been demonstrated that the aver-
age number of features required is 2  lengthðTÞ, so we set
N ¼ ð2þ 6rðlengthðTÞÞÞ  lengthðTÞ, which ensures that the number
of tags which cannot be completely coded is < 1 for every 5  108.
To set reliable values for the standard deviation, rðlengthðTÞÞ, we
created 106 random ðFÞ and ðTÞ for each length corresponding
to the powers of 2 ranging from 64 to 8192 bits, and proceeded
to the coding. To generate realistic random binary sequences T
and F, we created individual pseudo-random ﬂoat sequences fXg
with uniform distribution probability PrðXÞ 2 ½0;1 and trans-Algorithm 1. Keytag association
1: procedure KEYTAGGING(Ior , f, fTg; fkeytagTypeg; PrIssuer; fauthorised
2: ROIðIorÞ  segmentationðIor ;MBRÞ . To segment the ROI
3: ROIg  0:299  RðROIðIorÞÞ þ 0:587  GðROIðIorÞÞ þ 0:114  BðROIðIo
4: MWLðROIgÞ  dlog2ðminð#rowsðROIgÞ;#columnsðROIgÞÞÞe .
5: Coef ;h;w WTðROIg ; f ;MWLðROIgÞÞ . Wavelet transforma
6: GolombSeq LFSRð½1;0;0; 0;1;1;0;1;1;1;0;1;1;0;1;1;0; ½17;3
7: pointers ½1;1;1
8: for i in 1 to #T do . This loop associates one keytag in ea
9: ðFÞ  extractFeaturesðCoef ;h;w;1; keytagTypefig; lengthðTfig
10: ðTfigÞ  scrambleðTfig;GolombSeqÞ . See Algorithm 3
11: BM; pointers buildBinaryMapððFÞ; ðTfigÞ; pointers; keytagTy
12: KTfig  compressðBM; JBIG2Þ
13: KTfig  ½KTfig;DSðKTfig; ECDSA256; PrIssuerÞ . Adding
14: Skfig  createRandomKeyðAES128Þ
15: KTfig  encryptðKTfig;AES128; SkfigÞ . Symmetric encr
16: for i in 1 to #PbUsers do . This loop prepares the crypto
17: SkU  ½  . to allow users to retrieve their authorized
18: for j in 1 to #T do
19: if ðauthorisedTagsfi; jgÞ then . authorisedTags sets wh
20: SkU  ½SkU; Skfjg . have access to each keytag
21: KeysUserfig  encryptðSkU;RSA2048; PbUserfigÞ . Only
. his/he
22: return fKTg; fKeysUserg
23: procedure BUILDBINARYMAPðFÞ; ðTfigÞ; pointers; keytagType .
.
24: BM  zerosððFÞÞ . Initialized as a matrix of zeros with th
25: if keytagType ¼ Stable then
26: p 1
27: else if keytagType ¼ Semistable then
28: p 2
29: else . keytagType is Volatile
30: p 3
31: index pointersðpÞ . To continue encoding from the ﬁrst
32: for v in 1 to lengthððTfigÞÞ do
33: r; s obtainIndicesððFÞ; indexÞ . See Algorithm 3
34: while ðTfigÞðvÞ – ðFÞðr; sÞ do . To move forward alon
35: index indexþ 1 . encoding element until their valuformed them into binary sequences with random bias by doing
Y ¼ ðð1ÞðXf1g<0:5Þ  0:5  Xf2g þ XÞ > 0:5. The results from the cod-
ing test showed that the mean value of N was exactly
2  ðlengthðTÞÞ and that the r for those tag lengths was
½0:1853;0:1218;0:0865;0:0629;0:0423;0:0292;0:0214;0:0150. If
a given lengthðTÞ is among two of these studied values (e.g. 2048
and 4096), the r of the lower of these two values is used. Next,
buildBinaryMap creates a bi-level map BM of the same size as C
and initializes all its elements to be white (see Algorithm 1: line
24). This function encodes in BM the ðTÞ bits as features ðFjÞ:
the ﬁrst element moving forward along ðFÞ from the last encoding
element j 1 whose feature value matches the ðTiÞ bit value to be
encoded is marked as a black pixel in the same position in BM (see
Algorithm 1: 25–38 and Fig. 1: bottom). This process is repeated
until all ðTÞ bits have been coded. Finally, for a compact arithmetic
coding of BM, the standard JBIG2 [47] is applied in lossless mode
(Algorithm 1: line 12). It uses a context-dependent algorithm
called the QM coder. The result is the keytag KT, which will be used
to reverse this process and retrieve ðTÞ, by overlapping ðFÞ and
BM, and obtain T (Algorithm 2: line 15).Tagsg; fPbUserg)
rÞÞ . ROI to grayscale
Maximum wavelet
. decomposition level of ROIg
tion of ROIg
Þ . See Algorithm 3
ch iteration
Þ;MWLðROIgÞ;GolombSeqÞ
pefigÞ
a signature to each keytag
yption of each keytag
graphic material
keytags
ich users
an authorized user can decrypt
r entry with his/her PrUser
To build the binary map
that encodes ðTfigÞ as elements in ðFÞ
e same size as ðFÞ
available position
g ðFÞ from the last
es match
36: r; s obtainIndicesððFÞ; indexÞ
37: BMðr; sÞ  1 . To record the position where the element v in ðTfigÞ
38: index indexþ 1 . matches the ﬁrst available element in ðFÞ
39: indices pointers
40: indicesðpÞ  index . To update the pointer used
41: return BM; indices
Algorithm 2. Tag retrieval
1: procedure TAGRETRIEVAL(Ior , f, fKTg; fkeytagTypeg; PbIssuer;KeysUser; PrUser)
2: ROIðIorÞ  segmentationðIor ;MBRÞ . To segment the ROI
3: ROIg  0:299  RðROIðIorÞÞ þ 0:587  GðROIðIorÞÞ þ 0:114  BðROIðIorÞÞ . ROI to grayscale
4: MWLðROIgÞ  dlog2ðminð#rowsðROIgÞ;#columnsðROIgÞÞÞe . Maximum wavelet
. decomposition level of ROIg
5: Coef ;h;w WTðROIg ; f ;MWLðROIgÞÞ . Wavelet transformation of ROIg
6: GolombSeq LFSRð½1;0;0;0;1;1;0;1;1;1;0;1;1;0;1;1;0; ½17;3Þ . See Algorithm 3
7: fSkg  decryptðKeysUser;RSA2048; PrUserÞ . To obtain the symmetric keys
. of the keytags of the user
8: for i in 1 to #KT do . This loop retrieves a tag in each iteration
9: KTfig  decryptðKTfig;AES128; SkfigÞ . To decrypt the keytag
10: if checkDSðKTfig; ECDSA256; PbIssuerÞ then . To verify its digital signature
11: KTfig  removeDSðKTfigÞ . To remove the signature after veriﬁcation
12: BM  uncompressðKTfig; JBIG2Þ . To obtain the binary map that encodes a tag
13: lengthT  sumðBMÞ . The length of the tag is the number of 1s in BM
14: ðFÞ  extractFeaturesðCoef ;h;w; 0; keytagTypefig; lengthT;MWLðROIgÞ;GolombSeqÞ
. See Algorithm 3
15: Tfig  extractTagððFÞ;BM;GolombSeqÞ
16: else
17: Warning caused by invalid signature . The tag is not retrieved if the
. signature of its keytag is invalid
18: return fTg
19: procedure EXTRACTTAGðFÞ;BM;GolombSeq . To extract a tag from ðFÞ by means of BM
20: ðTÞ  ½ 
21: for r in 1 to #rowsðBMÞ do
22: for s in 1 to #columnsðBMÞ do
23: if BMðr; sÞ then . To move along BM and ﬁnd the 1s,
24: ðTÞ  ½ðTÞ; ðFÞðr; sÞ . which spot the positions in ðFÞ
. that encode the bits of ðTÞ
25: T  scrambleððTÞ;GolombSeqÞ . To retrieve the original tag, T
26: return T
Algorithm 3. Auxiliary procedures used in keytag association and tag retrieval
1: procedure LFSR(s; t) . To calculate the output of running a LFSR with initial state s and taps t
2: n lengthðsÞ
3: m lengthðtÞ
4: cð1; :Þ  s . C stores in its rows all the states of the LFSR
5: for k in 1 to 2n  2 do
6: bð1Þ  sðtð1ÞÞ  sðtð2ÞÞ . b is used to calculate the
7: if m > 2 then . feedback for the next state
8: for i in 1 to m 2 do
9: bðiþ 1Þ  sðtðiþ 2ÞÞ  bðiÞ
10: sð2 : nÞ  sð1 : n 1Þ . Shifting the bits of the state one position
11: sð1Þ  bðm 1Þ . The ﬁrst element in the state is the feedback
12: cðkþ 1; :Þ  s . from the previous
13: s outS cð:;nÞ . The output is the concatenation of the outputs of each state
14: return s out
15: procedure EXTRACTFEATURESðCoef ; h;w; filter; keytagType; lengthT;MWL;GolombSeqÞ
(continued on next page)
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16: if ðkeytagType ¼ StableÞ then
17: aWL MWL 6 . Selecting coefﬁcients from top levels,
18: while hðaWLþ 1Þ wðaWLþ 1ÞP 10  lengthT do . such their number of coefﬁcients
19: aWL aWLþ 1 . exceeds 10  lengthT
. The maximum number of coefﬁcients to be
20: C  Coef ð1 : hðaWLÞ;1 : wðaWLÞÞ . selected are those from levels P MWL 6
21: F  ðC P 0Þ . and the features of interest are their signs
22: else if ðkeytagType ¼ SemistableÞ then
23: aWL MWL 7 . Selecting coefﬁcients from levels 6 MWL 7
24: Cð1 : hðaWLþ 1Þ;1 : wðaWLþ 1ÞÞ  0 . by setting coefﬁcients from levels P MWL 6 to 0,
25: F  ðC P 0Þ . the features of interest are their signs
26: else . keytagType is Volatile
27: aWL 1 . Selecting coefﬁcients from
28: C  Coef ðhðaWLþ 1Þ þ 1 : end;wðaWLþ 1Þ þ 1 : endÞ . the HH subband of level 1,
29: F  LSBðCÞ . the features of interest are their LSBs
30: ðFÞ  scrambleðF;GolombSeqÞ
31: if ﬁlter then . Removing the features from the 2þ 6  rðlengthTÞ lowest magnitude coefﬁcients
32: rs ¼ ½0:1853;0:1218;0:0865;0:0629; 0:0423;0:0292;0:0214;0:0150
33: lengths ¼ ½64;128;256;512;1024;2048;4096;8192
34: for i in 1 to lengthðrsÞ do . This loop sets the value of r
35: if lengthT 6 lengthsðiÞ then . according to the value of lengthT
36: r rsðiÞ
37: sorted values; sorted indices sortðabsðCð:ÞÞ; descendingÞ . Obtaining the indices of
38: indicesToDelete sorted indicesðdð2þ 6  rÞ  lengthTe : endÞ . the lowest magnitude
39: rows IndicesToDelete; cols IndicesToDelete obtainIndicesðindicesToDelete;CÞ . coefs,
40: ðFÞðrows IndicesToDelete; cols IndicesToDeleteÞ  2 . which are removed by setting them
41: return ðFÞ . to 2, a value not existing in T (composed of 0s and 1s)
42: procedure SCRAMBLEðM;GolombSeqÞ . To scramble/descramble a binary vector
43: ðMÞ  M . or matrix M by adding GolombSeq
44: for i in 1 to #rowsðMÞ do
45: ðMÞði; :Þ  Mði; :Þ  GolombSeqð1þ ði 1Þ #columnsðMÞ : i #columnsðMÞÞ
46: return ðMÞ
47: procedure OBTAININDICESðM; pointersÞ . To translate unidimensional pointers into
48: r  dpointers=#columnsðMÞe . bidimensional indices for a matrix M
49: s 1þmoduleðpointers 1;#columnsðMÞÞ
50: return r; s . r are de indices for rows, s are the indices for columns
51: procedure ZEROS(M) . To initialize a vector/matrix of zeros
52: zerosM  M . of the same size as M
53: zerosMð1 : end;1 : endÞ  0
54: return zerosM
55: procedure SUM(M) . To sum all the elements in a matrix/vector M
56: S 0
57: for i in 1 to #rowsðMÞ do
58: for j in 1 to #columnsðMÞ do
59: S SþMði; jÞ
60: return S
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Since the keytagging algorithms are intended to become public,
they shall include cryptographic protection for the keytags. In the
ﬁrst place, the tag issuer shall digitally sign his/her keytags with
his/her private key for signature (PrIssuer, see Algorithm 1: line
13), so that any user can verify their origin and integrity with its
paired public key (PbIssuer, see Algorithm 2: line 10). In addition
to this, conﬁdential keytags shall be encrypted with random keys
(Skfig, see Algorithm 1: lines 14–15), which will be grouped and
encrypted with the public key of each intended user (PbUserfig,
see Algorithm 1: lines 16–21). In this way, only authorized users
can retrieve their symmetric keys with their private keys
(PrUserfig, see Algorithm 2: lines 7) and decrypt their authorized
keytags (Algorithm 2: line 9). According to the recommendationsof the NIST on long-term security (>year 2030) and the data con-
cerning the performance of different security algorithms provided
by [48], these are the choices for the following:
 Digital signature of a keytag KT: The standardized Elliptic Curve
Digital Signature Algorithm 256 [49], which performs
signature-veriﬁcation slightly faster (3.92–6.56Mcycles) than
the other two algorithms authorized by the NIST, DSA [50]
and RSA [51] with a 2048-bit key length. DSA was replaced by
ECDSA because the latter operates with smaller numbers, and
thus it is hard nowadays to ﬁnd implementations of DSA sup-
porting 2048 bits. On the other hand, RSA2048 has a similar
overall performance (11.06–0.29Mcycles), but ECDSA produces
a much shorter signature (512 bits vs 2048) with a roughly sim-
ilar security level. Digital signature keys, PbIssuer-PrIssuer, shall
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signature, it is required to verify that the digital certiﬁcate of
the signatory has not expired or been revoked, by means of
Check Revocation Lists or by using the Online Certiﬁcate
Status Protocol [52].
 Symmetric encryption of a keytag KT: the Advanced Encryption
Standard (AES [53]), chosen by the NIST after a contest [54] with
ﬁve ﬁnalists: MARS, RC6, Rjindael, Serpent and Twoﬁsh.
Rjindael, designed by Joan Daemen and Vicent Rijmen was the
winner, and it became the AES after some adjustments. It is con-
sidered the most secure symmetric algorithm and it is also the
fastest of the ﬁve AES ﬁnalists, with an encryption/decryption
speed of 12.6 cycles/byte. Regarding overhead, the key size is
set to 128 bits and its block size is also 128 bits, so padding bits
will be added if the data to be encrypted is not a multiple of this
block size. A symmetric key shall be created to encrypt each
keytag.
 Asymmetric encryption of authorized users’ access keys SkU:
RSA2048 [51], Public Key Cryptographic Standard #1 published
by RSA Security Inc. The algorithm elGamal [55] would be the
alternative, but RSA2048 is preferred because elGamal is not a
standard. The block size of RSA2048 is 2048 bits, so there will
be overhead if the data to be encrypted is not a multiple of this
block size, and its performance for encryption–decryption is
0.29–11.22Mcycles per block. Asymmetric encryption keys,
PbUsers-PrUsers, shall be renewed every 1–2 years.3.5. Support for JPEG2000 compression
The JPEG2000 algorithm is a standard for the efﬁcient represen-
tation and interchange of digital images with different characteris-
tics (scientiﬁc, medical, rendered graphics, etc.), allowing different
imaging models, e.g. client/server, real-time transmission, image
library archival, limited buffer and bandwidth resources. It was
created by members of the Joint Picture Experts Group, comprising
members of the International Telecommunication Union
Standardization Sector and the International Standardization for
Organization. JPEG2000 provides low bit-rate operation with
rate-distortion and improves the subjective image quality perfor-
mance of the previous standard, JPEG. Although this standard is
still not as widely used for natural images as its forerunner, it is
widespread in medical imaging and included in the DICOM stan-
dard. According to the mean opinion score (MOS) of medical
experts [56], this codec maintains good clinical quality at compres-
sion ratios up to 8–16 for magnetic resonance, ultrasound and
X-ray images. Compared to JPEG, it presents a better image
distortion-rate tradeoff and for an equal objective distortion (e.g.
PSNR ¼ 35 dB), it obtains a higher MOS.
Both this compressor and the keytagging process share the use
of wavelets, with the same ﬁlters, for a representation of the image
adjusted to the properties of the human vision system. As a result,
JPEG2000 compression causes no or very little distortion to the
retrieved tags, as is demonstrated in Section 4.4. In addition to this,
if the keytags association is integrated in the compression process,
most of the runtime cost of the former is covered by the latter (see
Section 4.5). Finally, JPEG2000 formats .jp2 and .jpx allow the
embedding of metadata, which can be used to conveniently store
the keytags.
To ensure full compliance of compression with keytagging, the
initial color transformation must be the irreversible TIC and the
further tiling of the image must be set to its size. The last steps
of the compression are independent from the keytagging. These
are performing context modeling and bit-plane arithmetic coding,
arranging the coded data in layers corresponding to quality levels
and performing post-compression rate allocation.4. Experimental evaluation
The features of this algorithm that need to be experimentally
evaluated are its robustness-capacity tradeoff when the image
undergoes different image modiﬁcations, its speciﬁcity when the
original image is replaced, its compatibility with JPEG2000 com-
pression, its average runtime cost for different parameter conﬁgu-
rations and its scalability when the image size is increased.
Complementarily, Section 5 analyzes the security foundations of
the keytagging method.
4.1. Evaluation setup
The image test set is composed of 64 images, sized
512 512 px2, corresponding to different medical modalities and
parts of the body:
 18 computed tomography (CT) images, gathered from [57]: 6
chest (Artiﬁx), 6 dental area (Incisix) and 6 pelvis (Pelvix)
images.
 18 magnetic resonance images (MRI), gathered from [57]: 6
brain (Brainix), 6 knee (Knix) and 6 thoracic and lumbar area
(MRIX) images.
 12 positron emission tomography (PET)-CT images from a
whole body scan, gathered from [57] (PETCETIX).
 16 ultrasound images (US): 4 mode B echocardiograms pro-
vided by Lozano Blesa Hospital in Zaragoza, 4 mode M, 4
Doppler color, 4 pulsed and continuous wave Doppler.
The image test set is processed with typical modiﬁcations in the
medical context, which are indexed for reference in Fig. 2 and
Tables 3 and 5:
 1–10. Compression: JPEG with quality factors 75%, 50%, 25%,
15% and 5% (Fig. 2: 5), JPEG2000 with compression ratios 4:1,
8:1, 16:1, 32:1 and 64:1 (Fig. 2: 10).
 11–18. Common image processing: b correction 0:3;0:5
(Fig. 2: 12), þ0:4 and þ0:7 (Fig. 2: 14), contrast stretching 2%
and 10% (Fig. 2: 16), color inversion (Fig. 2: 17) and local his-
togram equalization (Fig. 2: 18).
 19–27. Local operations: edge sharpening (Fig. 2: 19), median
ﬁltering 5 5 and 7 7 (Fig. 2: 21), averaging mask 5 5 and
7 7 (Fig. 2: 23), Gaussian ﬁltering 7 7 and 11 11, and
motion blur with 7 and 9 pixels displacement (Fig. 2: 27).
 28–33. Geometric transformations: clipping the ROI, rotating
90, 180 and 270, horizontal and vertical ﬂipping (Fig. 2: 33).
 34. Insertion of visible annotations (Fig. 2: 34).
 35. Blackening private data parts for anonymization.
And attempting to distort the tag or part of it, by means of a
watermark-based attack:
 36–40. Modiﬁcation of l ¼ 64 (Fig. 2: 34),
l ¼ 128; l ¼ 256; l ¼ 512; l ¼ 1024 and l ¼ 2048 sign bits from
the highest-level wavelet coefﬁcients of the image.
The robustness of keytagging to those modiﬁcations is evalu-
ated by measuring the distortion of the retrieved tags eT with
respect to the original T associated to Ior , by means of the
Normalized Hamming Distance [58]:
NHD ¼
eT  T
lengthðTÞ ; ð1Þ
where T and eT are binary vectors and  is the XOR logical operator.
Those eT that endure the image modiﬁcations end up very similar to
Fig. 2. ROI of a 512 512 px2 PET-CT image, original (0) and resulting from the application of JPEG QF = 5% and JPEG2000 CR 64:1 compression (5,10), b correction 0:5 and
þ0:7 (12,14), 10% contrast stretching (16), color inversion (17), local histogram equalization (18), edge sharpening (19), median ﬁlter 7 7 (21), image averaging 7 7 (23),
motion blur 9 (27), vertical ﬂipping (33), insertion of annotations (34) and watermark-based attack with l = 128 (36).
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obtain NHD 	 0:5, e.g. when retrieved from very degraded versions
of Ior . The Normalized Hamming Distance is very useful to deter-
mine how much redundancy needs to be added to overcome the
distortion of eT by means of some redundant coding.4.1.1. Simulation setup 1
The image modiﬁcations described above are applied to the test
set. A ﬁxed-length random tag T is associated to each image, by
means of keytags KT, retrieving eT from the corresponding modiﬁed
image fIor . The resulting NHD is calculated, and the process of
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and for the three types of keytags: stable, semistable and volatile.
The results are depicted in Table 3, which also shows howmuch dis-
tortion is caused to ROIg (the area of Ior used for the association of
keytags) by each modiﬁcation (which results in a ~ROIg), measured
with two different indices, the classic Peak Signal-to-Noise Ratio:
PSNRðI;eIÞ¼20  log10 maxðIð:ÞÞﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
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and also with the mean Structural SIMilarity index:MSSIMðI;eIÞ ¼ 1
M
XM
j¼1
ð2  lIjleI j þ ð0:01  LÞ2Þ  2 
PN
i¼1wi  ðIi  lIÞðeIi  leI Þ þ ð0:03  LÞ2
 
ðl2Ij þ l2eI j þ ð0:01  LÞ
2Þ  PNi¼1wi  ððIi  lIÞ2 þ ðeIi  leI Þ
2Þ þ ð0:03  LÞ2
  ; ð3Þwhere L is the dynamic range of the pixel values (255 for 8-bit
grayscale images), wi correspond to an 11 11
circular-symmetric Gaussian weighting function with standard
deviation 1.5 samples (normalized so that
PN
i¼1wi ¼ 1),
lI ¼
PN
i¼1wi  Ii;M is the number of local windows in the image
and N the number of pixels in the local window. Further details
about this index may be consulted in [59] and the implementation
of theMSSIM algorithm used in this work is available online at [60].
The PSNR is a simple mathematical measure that directly com-
pares the value of the pixels from the two images. Although it is
very popular, the correlation between this measure and the visual
perception of quality is not tight enough in many cases. TheMSSIM
assumes that the human vision system is highly adapted for
extracting structural information from images. Thus, it basically
compares local patterns of pixel intensities that have been normal-
ized for luminance and contrast.4.1.2. Simulation setup 2
This follows the process of setup 1 but considers each image as
a modiﬁed version of the rest. This setup is intended to evaluate
the degree of distortion of tags retrieved from images that are dif-
ferent from the original ones. Since some images of the test set
come from the same patient and acquisition session, some pairs
of ROIg are quite similar: ﬁve have PSNR > 20 dB and
MSSIM > 0:67, and may obtain low NHD values.4.2. Robustness-capacity
In the case of stable and semistable tags, there is a tradeoff
between their lengths and their robustness to image modiﬁcations.
Naturally, this occurs because the keytag association algorithm
sorts and selects image features according to their degree of
robustness, in descending order. Nonetheless, not all the modiﬁca-
tions have the same impact on the image. Fig. 1 illustrates the
effect of several modiﬁcations from Section 4.1 on a medical image,
and Table 3: column 2 (unshaded cells) shows the average PSNR
and MSSIM of the image test set after each modiﬁcation.
JPEG2000 compression is one of the most typical modiﬁcations. It
maintains the image clinical value with compression factors
around 16:1, obtaining PSNR ’ 42 dB and MSSIM ’ 0:99. Higher
compression ratios may cause unacceptable distortion, so they
are not recommended. Common image processing techniques can
help to ﬁnd a better representation of the image. b correctionchanges the brightness and can be reversed; contrast stretching,
local histogram equalization and color inversion help to enhance
the details of the image, and the latter can be totally reversed. In
the case of local operations, edge sharpening helps to enhance cer-
tain details, so it only modiﬁes volatile parts of the image. The rest
of the local operations modify both the semistable and volatile
parts of the image, high and some middle frequencies, leaving only
the stable parts intact. There are also several image modiﬁcations
that neither affect the image quality nor distort its associated tags.
These are clipping the ROI, since there are no keytags associated
outside this region; geometrical changes, which are detected and
reversed by means of a resynchronization step depicted inSection 5.2; inserting annotations, usually in the borders of the
ROI or outside; and darkening private data, which is most often
located outside the ROI. Finally, it was observed that modifying
the sign of the most signiﬁcant coefﬁcients in the highest decom-
position level is the most effective manner to willfully destroy
stable tags, but at the cost of completely destroying the image as
well, since the PSNR becomes 6 13.
The results in Table 3 (unshaded cells, left side of slashes), demon-
strate that the overall robustness of stable tags to any tested image
modiﬁcation is high up to capacities of 512–1024 bits, with an aver-
age NHD < 1%, decreasing for aggressive image compression and ﬁl-
tering at 2048 bits. It is worth mentioning that the local operations
(except edge sharpening) are the most challenging modiﬁcations,
since they affect many subbands. In fact, the motion blur modiﬁca-
tion yields an average NHD ¼ 3:6% in stable tags of 1024 bits.
Since the number of coefﬁcients available from level 3 (aWL for
512 512 px2 images) to the top is 16,384, and only one feature
can be extracted from each coefﬁcient, associating tags longer than
2048 bits will make the overall robustness decrease sharply.
BCH(511,259,30) coding [61] was successfully tested with stable
tags to improve their robustness. Each tag is divided into blocks of
259 bits and encoded as 511-bit redundant blocks. Although it is then
possible to correct up to 30 bits per block, the length of the associated
keytag is almost double that of the keytag associated to the tag with-
out BCH coding, which reduces its overall robustness. As can be seen
in Table 3 (unshaded cells, right side of slashes), the balance is posi-
tive and the NHD is reduced to 0 or almost 0 in most cases.
Nonetheless, BCH cannot be applied to all images for capacities of
P 2048 bits, which turn into P 4096 bits after this coding, since
some clipped ROIs do not have enough coefﬁcients for the keytag
association. Therefore, BCH coding–decoding will be applied to all
stable tags with length 6 1204 bits, the coding as a previous step
to Algorithm 1 and the decoding as a ﬁnal step after Algorithm 2.
Semistable tags show good robustness to mild image compres-
sion and common image processing, e.g. NHD ¼ 0:2%with L = 4096
for JPEG2000 compression 16:1, NHD ¼ 0% with L ¼ 8192 for 8:1.
As was also expected, their robustness to modiﬁcations that
remove details (e.g. image averaging 7 7) is very low, while for
edge sharpening, which enhances them, it is very high
(NHD ¼ 0:6% for L ¼ 8192). It is also observed that BCH coding is
pertinent for capacities up to 4096 bits, since it reduces the NHD
of permissible modiﬁcations, which do not affect the clinical value
of the image (JPEG2000 CR 16:1, common image processing and
edges sharpening). Therefore, semistable tags with length 6 4096
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tions is 6 2:1% for capacities of 8192 bits (to be implemented with-
out BCH coding), which is tolerable. Nonetheless, it is not
recommended exceeding this capacity since the distortion of per-
missible modiﬁcations increases a lot, e.g. NHD ¼ 8:7% for
JPEG2000 CR 16:1 with tag length of 16,384 bits. Finally, volatile
tags present very low robustness, with NHD 	 50%, to any irre-
versible modiﬁcation affecting the image ROI even when the tag
length is very short.
4.3. Speciﬁcity
Speciﬁcity is a relevant feature of keytagging, since it measures
how much information can be retrieved with a keytag when the
image it is associated to is replaced with another image (not
derived from the former). The distortion of the tags retrieved from
non-original images shall be considerably high for two reasons: to
avoid that someone can read the tag content without the originalTable 3
Average distortion of variable-length stable, semistable and volatile tags when the image test s
aWL according to Algorithm 1, shaded cells when maintaining the aWL of the original test seimage (thus, affecting its privacy) and to avoid that someone can
establish a relation between certain keytag an another image not
associated to it (thus, affecting its security). The results of the
speciﬁcity evaluation, using simulation setup 2 (see Section 4.1),
are represented in Table 4. It can be seen that the average values
of distortion for any keytag type and length are close to the ideal
NHD;50%, which guarantees perfect destruction of the tag content.
Nevertheless, it is also observed that the shorter the keytag, the
highest the likelihood of retrieving some tag with lower distortion.
In particular, the minimum NHDmeasured when retrieving the tag
content with a very similar image was 12.5% and 15.6% for 128-bit
stable and semistable keytags. Although these values far exceed
those obtained when evaluating robustness (retrieving the tags
from images derived from the original), NHD ¼ 0% for 128-bit
stable keytags and semistable keytags, they shall be taken into
account when designing certain keytag-based security measures
(see Sections 5.3 and 5.5).et (unshaded cells) and its interpolated counterpart (lightly shaded cells when calculating
t) undergo common modiﬁcations in the medical context (see Sections 4.1 and 4.6).
Table 3 (continued)
Table 4
Distortion of variable-length stable, semistable and volatile tags when retrieved from an image different from the one they were associated to (see Sections 4.1 and 4.3).
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As explained in Section 3.5, the keytagging algorithm has simi-
larities with the JPEG2000 compressor. For this reason, the robust-
ness of stable and semistable tags to JPEG2000 compression is
high, as the results in Table 3 demonstrate. Nonetheless, to claim
high compatibility with this compressor, the robustness to theimage modiﬁcations tested in the table must also be evaluated in
compressed versions of the original images. Since medical images
are expected to be compressed with ratios around 16, we tested
with ratios of 8, 16 and 32. The new results, which are compared
with those from the uncompressed images, are depicted in
Table 5. Positive values imply that the results of the compressed
test set are worse, since the NHD increases, while negative values
Table 5
Effect of JPEG2000 compression – with compression ratios of 8, 16, 32 – on the distortion of stable and semistable tags when the image test set undergoes other common modiﬁcations
in the medical context. See also the original distortion in Table 3.
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that the effect of keytagging compressed images instead of the
original ones is null on the distortion of stable tags if their length
is 6 512 bits. For 1024 bits, only two ﬁlters suffer a slight change,
and for 2048 bits the NHD increases by an average of 0.2%, which is
not signiﬁcant. Semistable tags maintain very similar robustness to
common processing, with the exception of b correction 0.5 for a
high capacity (8192 bits), which becomes signiﬁcantly worse.
Regarding local operations, there is an important change in the
results of semistable tags, but their overall robustness to these
operations is still low or very low, as intended. Volatile keytags
maintain minimum robustness to any modiﬁcation, with
NHD ’ 50%. Geometrical modiﬁcations and darkening private data
remain with NHD ¼ 0 for stable and semistable tags, and insertingTable 6
Average runtime cost (in ms, unshaded cells) of the processes for keytag association and tannotations on the compressed images produces no or very slight
change. Thus, it can be concluded that keytagging JPEG2000 com-
pressed images instead of the original images obtains very similar
results, which permits implementing the same applications with
the same operating parameters (see Section 5).
4.5. Average runtime cost
Most of the processes comprising Algorithm 1 and 2 are of lin-
ear complexity, as can be inferred from their description through-
out Sections 3.1–3.5. Table 6 shows the runtime cost of these
processes when executed in a MATLAB R2014a implementation
running on an Intel Core i5 Quad Core at 2.9 GHz with OS X
Yosemite. The slowest process is the tag BCH coding, taking 158–ag retrieval depending on different parameter values (shaded cells).
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stable tags with length 6 1024 bits and for semistable tags with
length6 4096 bits, and the decoding, which needs to be performed
online but takes only 15–24 ms. The segmentation and the color
reduction of the image have a negligible cost, while the wavelet
transformation is the second slowest process. Most of its runtime
cost is concentrated on calculating the ﬁrst 3–4 decomposition
levels and is highly dependent on the size of the original image.
When the size of the image is increased by two in both rows and
columns, the runtime cost increases approximately by four. The
coding of a keytag has linear complexity and low runtime costs,
e.g. 0.1 ms for 128-bit tags and 7:1 ms for 8192-bit tags; and its
decoding has a very low ﬁxed cost of 0.3 ms. Regarding crypto-
graphic processes, the digital signature of a keytag and its veriﬁca-
tion have a low ﬁxed cost, 2.6 and 7.2 ms. The cost of encrypting a
keytag depends linearly on the length of the tag and its runtime
cost is very low, 0.2 ms for a 8192-bit tag. The costs of encrypting
and decrypting a package of up to 16 access keys to keytags
intended for a user are 0.45 and 5.3 ms.
According to the data in Table 6, the overall delays for associat-
ing several keytags (in this example 4 128-bit stable, 3 2048-bit
semistable and 1 256-bit volatile) to an 512 512 px2 image (oper-
ations 1a-3a) and retrieving the corresponding tags (operations 1r,
4r-6r) are <55 ms and <115 ms respectively. If keytagging is inte-
grated within the JPEG2000 compressor, these overall delays drop
to 6 30, 90 ms for any image size, since this compressor performs
the wavelet transformation. Finally, when some tags are private, it
is necessary to encrypt and decrypt (operations 4a and 3r) the key-
tags and the corresponding access keys (operations 5a and 2r) of
each user. These operations add an extra delay of
< 0:5 #users ms in the keytag association and 5.5 ms in the tag
retrieval procedure.4.6. Scalability
The scalability of any technique for protecting medical images
is an important feature since the tendency is to increase their res-
olution for better image processing and visualization. The shaded
cells in Table 3 depict the robustness-capacity trade-off in a second
image test set. This corresponds to the original data set introduced
in Section 4.1 after bicubic interpolation by a factor of two in both
rows and columns, which has been processed with the same mod-
iﬁcations as the former but tuning the parameters so that the
image distortion caused is closely similar in PSNR and MSSIM.
Otherwise, if the parameter values for the image modiﬁcations
are maintained and the images are enlarged, the distortion caused
is usually lower (especially when the image undergoes compres-
sion and local operations) and the robustness-capacity tradeoff
would improve only because the image is less degraded.
Two different parameter conﬁgurations have been tested, using
the aWL in Algorithm 3: extractFeatures (the lightly shaded cells in
Table 3) and reusing the same aWL as for the original test set, com-
prised by 512 512 px2 images (the shaded cells in Table 3). When
associating stable keytags and performing image compression and
common image modiﬁcations, it can be seen that both options
obtain results similar to those for 512 512 px2 images up to tag
lengths of 1024 bits. The second option gives better results, but
these are still not good enough to allow capacities higher than
1024 bits. When associating stable keytags and performing local
image operations, the ﬁrst option obtains much better results than
the second, since the tag is associated to lower frequencies of the
image which better endure these types of image modiﬁcations.
These results are very similar to those obtained with
512 512 px2 images. Regarding semistable keytags, the ﬁrst
option also obtains results that are closer to those obtained with512 512 px2 images. The conﬁguration for volatile keytags has
been maintained by selecting coefﬁcients from the HH subband
in the ﬁrst decomposition level, to guarantee very low robustness.
Regarding the rest of the image modiﬁcations, the results are equal
or very similar for both options. As a general conclusion, the
parameters proposed in Algorithms 1 and 2 guarantee the scalabil-
ity of keytagging with respect to the robustness-capacity trade-off,
which is maintained for different image sizes.
Regarding the runtime cost of keytagging, increasing the size of the
image increases the cost of performing its wavelet transformation
(operations 1a and 4r in Table 6) by an n2 factor. For instance, calcu-
lating the MWL of a 512 512 px2 image takes 25:7 ms, while for a
1024 1024 px2 image it takes 111.1 ms and for a 2048 2048 px2
image it takes 478.7 ms. As a result, the overall delays for associating
keytags and retrieving tags presented in Section 4.5 (’ 55, 115ms)
increase to ’ 140, 200ms for 1024 1024 px2 images and to
’ 510, 570 ms for 2048 2048 px2. Therefore, it is recommended
combining keytagging with JPEG2000 compression in order to guar-
antee the scalability of keytagging, since it reduces these delays to
’ 30, 90 ms for any image size.5. Protection of the medical image by means of keytagging
The integration of keytagging to strengthen the protection of
images transmitted within medical architectures is analyzed in
Section 5.1. In addition to this, the operating parameters of keytag-
ging are adjusted in order to implement the security measures pro-
posed in Section 1. The use of speciﬁc keytags for image
resynchronization, authentication and traceability, copyright pro-
tection, private captioning, integrity control and location of tam-
pered areas is summarized in Table 7, and described in detail
throughout Sections 5.2–5.7. Finally the security of the keytagging
method, including all the security measures that it can implement,
is comprehensively assessed in Section 5.8.5.1. Integration of keytagging in medical architectures
The keytagging method is aimed for supplementing the security
in the transmission of images within cooperative medical architec-
tures, which at a technical level are typically supported by stan-
dards like DICOM (see Section 6). As portrayed in Fig. 3, the
integration of keytagging for the sharing of information among dif-
ferent users in these architectures poses three constraints:
 Although the keytagging algorithm guarantees that keytags are
protected and veriﬁed (by means of cryptography, see
Section 3.4), the integration of keytagging in medical architec-
tures requires the implementation of a reliable authorization
mechanism to control which speciﬁc entities (e.g. the device
that acquired the image the keytag is associated to, a physician
in charge of supervising the image, the holder of the image
copyright, etc.) are entitled to add, remove or consult keytags
of an image.
 The medical architecture shall also implement a mechanism to
record which keytags are added, removed or consulted, in order
to guarantee the auditability of these events and the account-
ability of the entities involved.
 The capacity of the different types of keytags to transmit infor-
mation among different users is conditioned by the perceptual
and clinical distortion that their instances of the image – asso-
ciated to the keytags – may undergo. This property is used for
the implementation of the keytag-based security measures
described throughout Sections 5.2–5.7.
able 7
ecommended parameters to implement different keytag-based security measures (see Section 5).
Security measure Keytag
type
aWL, allowed
wavelet level/s
Tag content Tag
length
(bits)
Tag
BCH
coding
Th, tag
detection
threshold
(bits)
Keytag
encryption
Issuer of DS keytag
Image
resynchronization
Stable P MWLðROIgÞ  6 Reference 128 Yes Most similar/
dissimilar tag
No Image acquisition device or
image issuer
Authentication and
traceability
Stable P MWLðROIgÞ  6 Reference 128 Yes 126 No Image acquisition device or
image issuer, and each entity
that processes the image
Pursuing illegal
image copies
Stable P MWLðROIgÞ  6 ID of image
copyright
holder
128 Yes 126 No Holder of image copyright
Image purchase Stable P MWLðROIgÞ  6 ID of image
buyer
128 Yes 126 Yes Holder of image copyright
Private captioning
with RBAC
Semistable 6 MWLðROIgÞ  7 Text/codes P 256
6 8192
No – Yes
(RBAC)
User authorized to update test
data
Integrity control Volatile 1 (HH subband) Reference 64 No – No Image acquisition device or
image issuer
Location of tampered
areas
Volatile 1 (HH subband) Reference P 512 No – No Image acquisition device or
image issuer
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RFig. 3. Overview of a medical architecture integrating keytagging.5.2. Image resynchronization
The medical image may be subject to geometrical transforma-
tions, which in the medical context may be 90/180/270 rotation,
vertical or horizontal ﬂipping. Being able to ﬁnd the original posi-
tion of the image is essential to retrieve its tags correctly, sinceotherwise they would be desynchronized. To accomplish this task,
a reference synchronization tag is associated to the image. This is a
128-bit public stable tag, which is retrieved six times, from the
received position and from each of the geometrical transforma-
tions (by rotating/mirroring each subband in Coef just after line 5
in Algorithm 2). The retrieved tag which is most similar to the
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the image to its original position. If it is observed that a retrieved
tag is more dissimilar than the most similar tag, e.g. 127 wrong bits
in the former and 80 correct bits in the latter, this means that the
original position corresponds to the former, whose colors have
been inverted. In that case, the values of Coef need to be inverted
(just after line 5 in Algorithm 2).5.3. Image authentication and traceability
Authentication refers to the capacity to determine if an image is
either derived from another, including perfect copies in this cate-
gory, or if it is unrelated. To implement image authentication, a ref-
erence public stable tag is associated to the original image. It is
then retrieved from the image to be authenticated. Only if the ref-
erence and retrieved tags are very similar or equal is the image
positively authenticated. The authentication ability of keytagging
is adjusted by means of two operating parameters: the length of
the reference tag and the detection threshold, Th. Assuming that
decoding each tag bit has a probability of success of ’ 0:5 when
it is done from a wrong image, the probability of false positives
Pfp in authentication can be approximated by means of the follow-
ing binomial distribution:
Pfp ¼
Xn¼lengthðTÞ
i¼Th
ð0:5Þn  n!
i!ðn iÞ! ð4Þ
The image is positively authenticated only if the number of cor-
rectly decoded tag bits exceeds the threshold,PlengthðTÞ
i¼1 ð ~Ti ¼ TiÞP Th. On the one hand, the probability of false
positives Pfp in image authentication is expected to be similar to
that required in applications of biometric recognition, 6 106.
Thus, avoiding images that were not keytagged for authentication
from obtaining false positives requires setting a high Th. On the
other hand, too high values of Th (low permitted NHD) will increase
the probability of false negatives (non-authenticated images that
were actually associated with the authentication tag). As can be
seen in Table 3, the robustness of stable tags with BCH coding is
total (NHD ¼ 0%) for tag lengths up to 512 bits, which ensures no
false negatives. However, a shorter tag is enough to ensure that
the likelihood of false positives, Pfp, is very low. Using
lengthðTÞ ¼ 128 and Th ¼ 126 (NHD ¼ 1:6%) makes
Pfp ¼ 2:5  1035. The minimum NHD in simulation setup 2 (see
Section 4.3) was obtained when associating-retrieving a reference
128-bit tag using the two most similar images in the test set
(PSNR ¼ 23dB), two close slices from a PET-CT. That NHD value,
the closest to causing a false positive, was 12.5%, still far greater
than Th (¼ 1:6%). To sum up, these operating parameters ensure
the perfect authentication of the whole test set.
Traceability policies intend to facilitate the tracking of entities
that process or simply forward the medical image test. This can
be easily accomplished if each entity validates the digital signa-
ture/s of the authentication keytag, authenticates the image and
adds its own digital signature to the authentication keytag if the
previous veriﬁcations are positive. Otherwise, the image is
reported as replaced or heavily tampered with and requested from
the last entity that validated it.5.4. Copyright protection
Copyright protection may be implemented by means of a speci-
ﬁc double authentication mechanism (see Section 5.3), involving
the image copyright holder and each image buyer, in the following
manner: The copyright holder is identiﬁed by means of a public ID (e.g.
Rubio@eHealthZ14), which he/she associates to the image by
means of a 128-bit stable tag. Besides, this tag has a secondary
purpose: enabling the automatic search for illegal copies of the
image in internet sites and databases. An internet bot may use
the keytag to retrieve tags from the images in targeted sites and
compare them with the copyright holder ID. If some image is
positively authenticated, it is an illegal copy.
 Each buyer is identiﬁed by means of an ID, which the copyright
holder associates to the image with a 128-bit private stable tag.
In this manner, any buyer can prove that he/she holds a legal
copy, even if he/she has made substantial modiﬁcations to it.
5.5. Private captioning with RBAC
The association of private information with the image, only
retrievable by authorized users if the image preserves its clinical
value, may be easily carried out by means of semistable private
tags. Nonetheless, the results in Table 3 suggest that the overall
length of these tags should not exceed 8192 bits. Therefore, it is
recommended compressing them as much as possible, e.g. by
replacing text with codes. Nevertheless, it is also recommended
that the overall tag length is not too short, to guarantee a good
speciﬁcity. As pointed out in Table 4, a minimum length of
256-bit ensures that the minimum distortion (NHD) of tags
retrieved from very similar images (but not derived from the orig-
inal) is high, >23%. Therefore, short tags shall add padding bits until
their length is P 256 bits.
Cryptographic-based RBAC may be applied to improve private
captioning (see Algorithms 1: lines 14–21 and Algorithm 2: lines
7–9). For each tag, its associated keytag is symmetrically encrypted
with a speciﬁc symmetric key, Sk, and all the symmetric keys cor-
responding to tags intended for a user are encrypted with his/her
public key, PbUserfig. Thus, each user decrypts his/her symmetric
keys fSkg with his/her private key, PrUserfig, and then decrypts
his/her keytags with these symmetric keys. All this can be easily
managed by encapsulating the keytags with CMS. There are two
reasons to implement RBAC in this manner, instead of by associat-
ing a different keytag for each user. First, because all the users
retrieve the same tag content, even when the image is modiﬁed.
Otherwise the users may retrieve tag contents with different
degrees of distortion. Second, because associating several keytags
with the same content would reduce the overall capacity.
5.6. Integrity control and location of tampered areas
The detection and location of modiﬁcations affecting the image
may be efﬁciently performed by means of public volatile tags.
Table 3 shows that these tags suffer high distortion even when
the image modiﬁcations are mild, which implies very low robust-
ness. Given these results, we propose the following:
 For integrity control, it is sufﬁcient to use 64-bit reference tags,
since they have an average NHD ’ 50%. Thus, approximately
32 bits are wrongly detected when the image ROI undergoes
non-geometrical modiﬁcations (geometrical modiﬁcations are
reversed by means of resynchronization, see Section 5.2). The
exception to this, NHD slightly > 0, occurs when the image is
partially annotated in the ROI, since only a few pixels in isolated
regions change.
 For the location of tampered areas, the position in BM of
wrongly detected tag bits is marked in the corresponding posi-
tions of the image. The even distribution of tampered pixels,
detected after a common image modiﬁcation, is shown in
Fig. 4: center. Logically, longer reference tags are able to achieve
ﬁner granularity in the delimitation of modiﬁed image areas,
Fig. 4. Location of tampered areas on the ROI of a 512 512 px2 original image (left), on its JPEG QF ¼ 15% compressed version (center, tag length = 128 bits) and on an
annotated version (right, tag length = 512 bits).
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tions in the image ROI. Considering that usually only ’ 2% pix-
els have been annotated and half (1%) change the value of the
features used the for coding of these keytags (the LSB of certain
wavelet coefﬁcients), a 512-bit tag is able to locate approxi-
mately 5 tampered areas in the ROI, as shown in Fig. 4: right.
It is worth noting that implementing location of tampered areas
already ensures integrity control, but not conversely.5.7. Simultaneous implementation
This section analyzes whether all the previous security mea-
sures can be implemented simultaneously in the images from the
test set, by analyzing the results of robustness-capacity in
Table 3 and the keytagging parameters in Table 7. According to
these results, the security measures based on public stable tags
can reach an overall capacity of 512 bits with NHD ¼ 0, and they
only require 384 bits. Regarding semistable tags, their capacity
shall be adjusted to 6 8192 bits in order to maintain an adequate
robustness in private captioning. With respect to volatile tags,
there are no capacity restrictions. Thus, all these security measures
can be implemented simultaneously. Furthermore, in this case, it is
recommended that the tags for image resynchronization,
authentication-traceability and location of tampered
areas-integrity control associate the same reference. This would
require extending the reference used for location of tampered
areas, e.g. by repeating several times the shorter reference used
to implement the other security measures. In this manner, the ref-
erence does not need to be transmitted since comparisons may be
established among the tags retrieved. Consequently, the
keytagging-based security system would be able to operate in a
blind manner.
An overview of the overall keytagging system is introduced
below by means of the following use case. A patient’s medical
image is acquired by means of a CT scanner, whose software gen-
erates a 128-bit reference and runs the keytagging algorithm to
associate it by means of three keytags. Two of these keytags are
stable, intended for resynchronization and authentication, and
the third is volatile (resulting from the concatenation of the refer-
ence 8 times), intended for the location of tampered areas. Thekeytags are attached with the image ﬁle and recorded in the audit
trail system of the medical architecture to which the CT scan is
connected. The access control system of the architecture estab-
lishes that this image can be edited by two specialists of the
patient and consulted by his general practitioner. Each time that
one of them accesses the image, the visualization software runs
the keytagging algorithm to validate the keytags associated and
read their content. Next, the reference introduced after the acqui-
sition is used to authenticate and resynchronize the image (if nec-
essary), and also to pinpoint tampered areas (if any). The
specialists can introduce text regarding the diagnosis of the patient
or his/her treatment, which the visualization software will associ-
ate by running the keytagging algorithm to add semistable keytags.
These keytags will be attached in the image ﬁle and recorded in the
audit trail system. The three users can consult the image, perform
modiﬁcations on it and, using the visualization software, consult
the keytags. In spite of possible modiﬁcations, the visualization
software will still be able to authenticate and resynchronize the
image, to display the content of the semistable keytags (if the
image has not lost its clinical value) and to pinpoint the modiﬁed
areas. Finally, the specialists (but not the practitioner) can use
the visualization software to order the removal of their own semi-
stable keytags from the image ﬁle, being this event recorded in the
audit trail system.5.8. Risk assessment
The keytagging method, described in Section 3, involves differ-
ent elements; namely, the keytagging algorithm itself, the key-
tagged image, the keytag/s associated to it and the content of the
corresponding tag/s. Several considerations can be done about
the character, either public or private, of these elements. In the ﬁrst
place, Kerckhoff’s principle states that the system shall be secure
even if everything about it, except certain keys, is public knowl-
edge. Hence, considering that the enemy will eventually discover
the keytagging algorithm [62], it is proposed in Section 3.4 to make
it public from the beginning. Similarly, medical keytagged images
cannot be considered as impossible to obtain under any circum-
stance. In fact, certain situations may facilitate attackers to obtain
an image copy. Some patients may give their informed consent to
the use of their medical images for certain purposes – e.g. teaching,
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accesses to the image (and the number of potential opportunities
for attacker accordingly); and even strictly conﬁdential images
may be a reasonably target for attackers if at a certain time they
are handled (e.g. ﬁltered, annotated) out of a protected standard-
ized format (e.g. as JPX instead of DICOM ﬁles). Regarding keytags
and their associated tag contents, they can be either public or pri-
vate depending on the security measures that they implement (see
Table 7). The former are available to anyone for consultation, while
the latter are considered as the most difﬁcult elements to be
obtained (in clear) by an attacker.
With the purpose of weakening the security of the system, an
attacker with access to some of its elements may try to perform
certain attack/s to interfere with the security measures described
throughout Sections 5.2–5.6. Therefore, performing a comprehen-
sive risk assessment, comprising all feasible attacks and the exist-
ing countermeasures, is essential for the prevention of potential
security breaches. The following risk assessment, based on refer-
ence publications on watermarking security [63–65] and tailored
to the speciﬁcs of keytagging, analyzes attacks depending on the
keytag-based measures affected, the actions intended by the
attacker and the system elements he/she needs access to. The fol-
lowing attacks may potentially affect the privacy in image pur-
chase and in image captioning (see Sections 5.4 and 5.5):
 Unauthorized detection and reading of private keytags. It is
impossible to detect keytags if the attacker only knows the
image: no information can be extracted from the image alone
since keytagging does not modify it in any manner. As regards
to reading the whole content of private tag/s associated to an
image, the algorithm requires both the image and the plain key-
tag/s associated. With respect to the former, the attacker may
try to use another image if he/she does not have the original,
but the speciﬁcity of keytags guarantees that the content
retrieved will be highly distorted, as demonstrated in
Section 4.3. Regarding the latter, keytag/s is/are protected with
adequate encryption (see Section 3.4), which makes obtaining
its/their plain version/s very unlikely. There is also another possi-
ble attack, which – generally speaking – requires even more
knowledge about the system and only permits reading part of
certain tag/s content. To explain this attack, it is worth reminding
that while public keytags shall be associated to different features
of the image to avoid eavesdropping, different independent users
may associate private keytags to certain repeated image features.
Therefore, if an attacker knows one or several plain private key-
tags with its/their associated tags, he/she would be able to read
those tag bits from other keytags associated to the same image
features. Nevertheless, this requires the attacker being able to
break the encryption of the keytags from different users (to
obtain the plain versions) and to know the tag content of at least
a private keytag, which is highly unlikely.
And these attacks may potentially affect all the security mea-
sures described throughout Sections 5.2–5.6:
 Writing of forged keytags. The attempt to copy a legitimate key-
tag in another image will not succeed since the keytagging algo-
rithm guarantees that keytags are dependent on the image. This
high speciﬁcity guarantees that the tag content read will be
highly distorted, as proved in Section 4.3. Alternatively, any
attacker can decide to associate his/her own keytag/s to any
image, since the keytagging algorithm is intended to become
public. Nevertheless, the attacker cannot add the required digi-
tal signature of a trusted entity to the keytags, unless he/she has
broken or stolen the private key of a trusted entity – which is
highly unlikely. Malicious removal of legitimate keytags. There are three possi-
bilities: attacking the keytag, the image it is associated to or the
association. As regards to keytags, although they may be
attacked, its integrity and provenance can be evaluated any
time by means of its digital signature, which is a mandatory ele-
ment (see Table 7). As explained before, to forge the digital sig-
nature of the signatory entity, so that the attack cannot be
detected, the attacker needs to break/steal his/her private key.
Regarding attacks on the image, their effects on the robustness
of the different types of keytags have been evaluated in
Section 4.2. In fact, the different measures described throughout
Sections 5.2–5.6 are designed based on the intended robustness
of keytags – e.g. authentication is based on stable keytags,
which can be detected even when the image undergoes impor-
tant modiﬁcations; tamper detection is based on volatile key-
tags, which get highly distorted even if the modiﬁcation/s on
the image are minor. Therefore, the effect of the modiﬁcations
of the image have already been taken into account in the design
of the security measures. Alternatively, the keytagging algo-
rithm can be exploited to change the value of image features
used to encode the keytags. In point of fact, this attack can
destroy the tag content when the plain keytag is known (e.g.
if it is public), but at the cost of destroying the image as well
(see Section 4.2). Regarding collusion attacks (popular in water-
marking), which combine different keytagged versions of an
image to produce another image with distorted keytags, they
would be pointless since any keytagged version of an image is
exactly like the original. Finally, the attacker may attempt to
make the tag reader think that certain keytags are associated
to a different image, with the intention of confusing him/her.
To detect this attack, it has been proposed associating a refer-
ence tag with two independent stable keytags (one for image
resynchronization and another for image authentication and
traceability, see Section 5.7). In this manner, the tag content
of these keytags only match when retrieved from the original
image (or from an image derived from it, e.g. compressed or
ﬁltered).
 Malicious edition of legitimate keytags. This is a combination of
the previous types of attack. Therefore, it requires knowing the
plain keytag (breaking its encryption if it is private), editing the
content of the keytag total or partially (as intended by the
attacker), replacing the previous signature with a new valid
one (which requires the private key of the original keytag signa-
tory) and, if the keytag is private, re-encrypting the keytag with
the same cryptographic key used for its decryption.
The careful design of the keytagging algorithm, its combination
with adequate cryptographic elements and the choice of the
parameters to enforce the different security measures (mainly
the robustness of the keytags) are the foundations of the keytag-
ging method. From this security assessment, it can be concluded
that the only manner to weaken the security of this system is by
attacking the cryptographic protection of the keytags. Hence, the
security of keytagging cannot be considered as lower than the
security of cryptography. On the contrary, the former requires an
additional element for the retrieval of the content associated: the
image.6. Integration with DICOM
In the present e-health model, the access of users to medical
images is controlled by the Health and Radiology Information
Systems (HIS and RIS) of the hospital, which communicate with
the Picture Archive and Communication System (PACS) where they
are stored and managed. In turn, the PACS communicates with the
28 Ó.J. Rubio et al. / Journal of Biomedical Informatics 56 (2015) 8–29devices in charge of the acquisition to obtain the medical images.
All the processes involved in this context, including storage, trans-
mission, handling and impression of medical images are usually
regulated by the DICOM [1] standard, whose robust ﬁle format
and network protocol are currently supported by the vast majority
of vendors of medical equipment. To fulﬁll legal regulations, the
security of the DICOM ﬁle is very high and it also implements a
reliable role-based access control to protect patient privacy. The
most sensitive DICOM contents, its conﬁdential tags and the image
(if it helps to identify the patient), are put into digital envelopes
and sealed by means of CMS. Nonetheless, this purely crypto-
graphic policy has some disadvantages. The ﬁrst major issue is that
the content of a non-tampered envelope is technically retrievable
even if the rest of the ﬁle has been corrupted. It would be prefer-
able if those DICOM tags containing the most sensitive information
were to become unreadable if the image is corrupted. Furthermore,
it would be desirable that the image could not be requested if it has
been seriously distorted or replaced. The second major issue,
explained in Section 1, is the difﬁculty of developing cooperative
architectures that allow authorized users to update the DICOM ﬁle
and share it with the rest of the users while maintaining its integ-
rity control, authenticity and traceability.
Preserving the DICOM digital envelopes, which already imple-
ment CMS, different keytags may be used to associate DICOM tags
to the image by replacing the original values with those of its key-
tags. The DICOM data model is deﬁned by attributes that identify
information entities, namely patient, study, series and instance of
the image. Since the patient ID tag (0010,0020) is the most impor-
tant, it would be interesting to associate it to the image perma-
nently. Thus, our proposal is to associate the patient ID by means
of two stable keytags, one used for authentication and traceability,
and the other for resynchronization. Besides, concatenated four
times to lengthen, it may also be associated by means of a volatile
keytag for integrity control and location of tampered areas. Finally,
semistable keytags may be used to associate important private
DICOM tags, intended to become uninterpretable if the image loses
its clinical value – e.g. due to aggressive image processing. These
tags might be some of those included in the DICOM Basic
Diagnostic Imaging Report, Study Date tag (0008,0020), Accession
Number tag (0008,0050), Modality tag (0008,0060), Manufacturer
tag (0008,0070), Referring Physician’s Name tag (0008,0090),
Responsible Organization tag (0008,0116), etc.
The features of keytagging, non-modiﬁcation of the image, low
complexity (shown in Section 4.5), scalability (shown in
Section 4.6), compatibility with JPEG2000 to encode the image
(explained in Section 3.5) and with CMS to protect the keytags,
both implemented by DICOM, all together guarantee that the pro-
posed stable, semistable and volatile keytags can be seamlessly
integrated within this medical imaging standard to enhance its
security and privacy.7. Conclusions and future work
Keytagging, a method based on associating tags of variable
robustness to the image ROI, has proved to be an interesting alter-
native for the protection of medical image-based tests. In fact, this
technique has a series of advantages over watermarking and cryp-
tography alone. It preserves the image clinical content, prevents
image forgery and collusion attacks, permits associating data to
very stable features of the image and obtains a substantial
capacity-robustness tradeoff by means of simple operations. In
addition, the keytags (keys to access the tags) are tightly bound
to the image, since no tag bit can be derived from them alone or
by using an unrelated image. Tested with 512 512 and
1024 1024 pixel images, the robustness of stable tags tomodiﬁcations that are typical in the medical context is total
(NHD ¼ 0) up to 512 bits and still very high (only three modiﬁca-
tions produce NHD > 0) for 1024 bits. Semistable tags obtain good
robustness to JPEG2000 CR 16:1 image compression and contrast
and brightness change (NHD ¼ 0% for tag length of 4096 bits),
and bad, as intended, to local operations that distort the details
of the image (average NHD > 15% for tag length P512 bits).
Volatile tags achieve very little robustness to any modiﬁcation of
the image, even when associating very short tags (NHD > 45%
for length P64 bits). Regarding runtime costs, associating a set of
keytags and retrieving the corresponding tags for the simultaneous
implementation of complementary security measures takes ’ 55,
115 ms for 512 512 px2 images; ’ 140, 200 ms for
1024 1024 px2 images and ’ 510, 570 for 2048 2048 px2
images. To guarantee the scalability of this approach, it has also
been demonstrated that this method can be combined with
JPEG2000 compression, maintaining its robustness while reducing
the keytag association-tag retrieval delays to only ’ 30, 90 ms for
any image size.
As future work, we will evaluate improved keytag encoding
methods in order to reduce the overhead, which is the main draw-
back of keytagging with respect to watermarking and cryptogra-
phy. In addition to this, we intend to avoid the need for BCH
coding in stable and semistable tags and to raise the capacity of
semistable tags. To achieve this, we will research into the com-
bined use of both most signiﬁcant and sign bits of high magnitude
coefﬁcients as stable features, and also on the use of new trans-
forms that may perform better than wavelets.
To sum up, keytagging achieves the transparent, secure and efﬁ-
cient association of stable, semistable and volatile tags to medical
images. This enables the simultaneous implementation of private
captioning with role-based access control, integrity control and
location of tampered areas, authentication, traceability and copy-
right protection. Finally, it has been explained how this method
can be seamlessly integrated within DICOM to facilitate the
deployment of efﬁcient medical architectures where different
authorized users can update DICOM ﬁles with new information
and share it without sacriﬁcing any security measure.Conﬂict of interest
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